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F rom the days when the Romans first came to appreciate the economic value of prisoners of war as a source of labor, and began to use them as 
slaves instead of killing them on the field of battle, l until the drafting and 
adoption by a comparatively large number of members of the then family of 
sovereign states of the Second Hague Convention of 1899,2 no attempt to 
regulate internationally the use made of prisoner-of-war labor by the Detaining 
Power3 had been successful.4 The Regtftations attached to that Convention 
dealt with the subject in a single article,S as did those attached to the Fourth 
Hague Convention of 19076 which, with relatively minor changes, merely 
repeated the provisions of its illustrious predecessor. A somewhat more extensive 
elaboration of the subject was included in the 1929 Geneva Convention relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War7 (hereinafter referred to as the 1929 
Convention). And, although still far from perfect, the provisions concerning 
prisoner-of-war labor contained in the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners ofW ar8 (hereinafter referred to as the 1949 Convention) 
constitute an enlightened attempt to legislate a fairly comprehensive code 
governing the major problems involved in the employment of prisoners of war 
by the Detaining Power.9 The purpose of this study is to analyze the provisions 
of that code and to suggest not only how the draftsmen intended them to be 
interpreted, but also how it can be expected that they will actually be 
implemented by Detaining Powers in any future war.10 
While there are very obvious differences between the employment of workers 
available through a free labor market and the employment of prisoners of war, 
even a casual and cursory study will quickly disclose a remarkable number of 
similarities. The labor union which is engaged in negotiating a contract for its 
members is vitally interested in: (1) the conditions under which they will work, 
including safety provisions; (2) their working hours and the holidays and 
vacations to which they will be entitled; (3) the compensation and other 
monetary benefits which they will receive; and (4) the grievance procedures 
which will be available to them. (Of course, in each industry there will also be 
numerous items peculiar to that industry.) Because of the uniqueness of 
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prisoner-of-war status, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference which drafted the latest 
prisoner-of-war convention felt it necessary, in negotiating for the benefit of 
future prisoners of war, to continue to cover certain items in addition to those 
listed above, such as the categories of prisoners of war who may be compelled 
to work (a problem which does not normally exist for labor unions in a free 
civilian society, although it may come into existence in a total war economy); 
and, collateral to that, the specific industries in which they mayor may not be 
employed. Inasmuch as these latter problems lie at the threshold of the utilization 
of prisoner-of-war labor, they will be considered before those enumerated 
above. 
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the labor provisions of the 1949 
Convention, and how one may anticipate that they will operate in time of war, 
it seems both pertinent and appropriate to survey briefly the history of, and the 
problems encountered in, the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor during the 
past century. That period is selected because its earliest date represents the point 
at which cartels for the exchange of prisoners of war had ceased to have any 
considerable importance and yet belligerents were apparently still unaware of 
the tremendous potentiality of the economic asset which was in their hands at 
a time of urgent need. 
The American Civil War (1861-1865) was the first major conflict involving 
large masses of troops and large numbers of prisoners of war in which exchanges 
were the exception rather than the rule. 11 As a result, both sides found 
themselves encumbered with great masses of prisoners of war; but neither side 
made any substantial use of this potential pool of manpower, although both 
suffered from labor shortages.12 This was so, despite the statement in Lieber's 
Code 13 that prisoners of war "may be required to work for the benefit of the 
captor's government, according to their rank and condition," and despite the 
valiant efforts of the Quartermaster General of the Union Army, who sought 
unsuccessfully, although fully supported by Professor Lieber, to overcome the 
official reluctance to use prisoner-of-war labor. The policy of the Federal 
Government was that prisoners of war would be compelled to work "only as 
. f· al . f h ,,14 an mstrument 0 repns agamst some act 0 t e enemy. 
In 1874 an international conference, which included eminent representatives 
from most of the leading European nations, met in Brussels at the invitation of 
the Tsar of Russia "in order to deliberate on the draft of an international 
agreement respecting the laws and customs of war." 15 This conference prepared 
a text which, while never ratified, constituted a major step forward in the effort 
to set down in definitive manner those rules of land warfare which could be 
considered to be a part of the law of nations. It included, in its Article 25, a 
provision concerning prisoner-of-war labor which adopted, but considerably 
amplified, Lieber's single sentence on the subject quoted above. This article was 
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subsequently adopted almost verbatim by the Institute of International Law 
when it drafted Articles 71 and 72 of its "Oxford Manual" in 1880;16 and it 
furnished much of the material for Article 6 of the Regulations attached to the 
Second Hague Convention of 1899 and the same article of the Regulations 
attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. 
Despite all of these efforts, the actual utilization of prisoner-of-war labor 
remained negligible during the numerous major conflicts which preceded W orId 
War I. This last was the first modern war in which there was total economic 
mobilization by the belligerents; and there were more men held as prisoners of 
war and for longer periods of time than during any previous conflict. 
Nevertheless, it was not until 1916 that the British War Office could overcome 
opposition in the United Kingdom to the use of prisoner-of-war labor;17 and 
after the entry of the United States into the war, prisoners of war held in this 
country were not usefully employed until the investigation of an attempted mass 
escape resulted in a recommendation for a program of compulso~ 
prisoner-of-war labor, primarily as a means of reducing disciplinary problems.1 
When the belligerents eventually did find it essential to make use of the 
tremendous prisoner-of-war manpower pools which were available to them, 
the provisions of the Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 
1907 proved inadequate to solve the numerous problems which arose, thereby 
necessitating the negotiation of a series of bilateral and multilateral areements 
between the various belligerents during the course of the hostilities.1 Even so, 
the Report of the "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the 
War and on Enforcement of Penalties," created by the Preliminary Peace 
Conference in January, 1919, listed the "employment of prisoners of war on 
unauthorized works" as one of the offenses which had been committed by the 
Central Powers during the war.2° 
The inadequacies in this and other areas of the Fourth Hague Convention of 
1907, revealed by the events which had occurred during the course ofWorId 
War I, led to the drafting and ratification of the 1929 Convention.21 It was this 
Convention which governed many of the belligerents during the course of 
W orId War II;22 but once again international legislation based on the experience 
gained during a previous conflict proved inadequate to control the more serious 
and comp'licated situations which occurred during a subsequent period of 
hostilities.23 Moreover, the proper implementation of the provisions of any 
agreement must obviously depend in large part upon the good faith of the parties 
thereto-and belligerents in war are, perhaps understandably, not motivated to 
be unduly generous to their adversaries, with the result that frequently decisions 
are made and policies are adopted which either skirt the bounds oflegal propriety 
or actually exceed such bounds. The utilization of prisoner-of-war labor by the 
Detaining Powers proved no exception to the foregoing. Practically all prisoners 
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of war were compelled to work.24 To this there can be basically no objection. 
But during the course of their employment many of the protective provisions 
of the 1929 Convention (and of the Fourth Hague Convention of1907 which 
it complemented) were either distorted or simply disregarded. 
The leaders of Hitler's Nazi Germany were aware ofits shortage oflabor and 
appreciated the importance of the additional pool of manpower afforded by 
prisoners of war as a source of that precious wartime commodity. Nevertheless, 
for a considerable period of time they permitted their ideological differences 
with the Communists to overcome their common sense and urgent needs.25 
And in Japan, which, although not a party to the 1929 Convention, had 
committed itself to apply its provisions, those relating to frisoner-of-war labor 
were among the many which were assiduously violated? 
Like the other belligerents, the United States found an urgent need for 
prisoner-of-war labor, both within its home territory and in the rear areas of the 
embattled continents. One study even goes so far as to assert that the use of 
Italian prisoners of war in the Mediterranean theater was the only thing which 
made it possible for the United States to sustain simultaneously both the Italian 
campaign and the invasion of South em France, thereby hastening the downfall 
of Germany?7 Similarly, it was found that in the United States the use of 
prisoners of war for work at military installations, and in agriculture and other 
authorized industries, served to release both Army service troops and civilians 
for other types of work which were more directly related to the war effort.28 
While the benefits of prisoner-of-war labor to the Detaining Power are 
patent, benefits flowing to the prisoners of war themselves as a result of their use 
in this manner are no less apparent. The reciprocal benefits resulting from the 
proper use of prisoner-of-war labor is well summarized in the following 
statement: 
The work done by the PW has a high value for the Detaining Power, since it 
makes a substantial contribution to its economic resources. The PW's home 
country has to reckon that the work so done increases the war potential of its 
enemy, maybe indirectly; and yet at the same time it is to its own profit that its 
nationals should return home at the end of hostilities in the best possible state of 
health. Work under normal conditions is a valuable antidote to the trials of 
captivity, and helps PW to preserve their bodily health and morale?9 
During the close reappraisal of the 1929 Convention which followed World 
War II, the provisions thereof dealing with the labor of prisoners of war were 
not overlooked; and the Diplomatic Conference which met in Geneva in 1949 
redrafted many of those provisions of the 1929 Convention in an effort to plug 
the loopholes which the events of World War II had revealed. It is the 1949 
Convention resulting from this work which will be used in the review and 
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analysis of the rights and obligations ofbelligerents and prisoners of war in any 
future conflict insofar as prisoner-of-war labor is concerned. 
Categories of Prisoners of War Who May be Compelled to Work 
In general, Article 49 of the 1949 Convention provides that all prisoners of 
war, except commissioned officers, may be compelled to work. However, this 
statement requires considerable elaboration and is subject to a number of 
limitations. 
Q. The Detaining Power is specifically limited in that it may compel only 
those prisoners of war to work who are physically fit, and the work must be of 
a nature to maintain them "in a good state of physically and mental health." In 
determining physical fitness, it is prescribed that the Detaining Power must take 
into account the age, sex, and physical aptitude of each individual prisoner of 
war. It may be assumed that these qualities are to be considered not only in 
determining whether a prisoner of war should be compelled to work but also 
in determining the type of work to which the particular prisoner of war should 
be assigned. For example, women (and it must be accepted that in any future 
major war there will be many female prisoners of war) should not be given tasks 
requiring the lifting and moving of heavy loads; and, frequendy, men who are 
physically fit to work may not have the physical aptitude for certain jobs by 
reason of their size, weight, strength, age, lack of experience, et cetera.30 It 
would appear that the provisions of Article 49 of the 1949 Convention require 
the Detaining Power, within reasonable limits, to assure the assignment of the 
proper man to the job. 
Moreover, under the provisions of Articles 31 and 55 of the 1949 Convention, 
the determination of physical fitness must not only be made by medically 
qualified personnel and at regular monthly intervals, but also whenever the 
prisoner of war considers himself physically incapable of working. It should be 
noted that the first of the cited articles is a general one which requires the 
Detaining Power to conduct thorough medical inspections, monthly at a 
minimum, primarily in order to supervise the general state of health of the 
prisoners of war and to detect contagious diseases; while the second, which calls 
for a medical examination at least monthly, is intended to verify the physical 
fitness of the prisoner of war for work, and particularly for the work to which 
he is assigned.31 It is evident that one medical examination directed 
simultaneously towards both objectives would meet the obligations thus 
. d h D .. P 32 Impose upon t e etammg ower. 
The provision of Article 55 which authorizes a prisoner of war to appear 
before a medical board whenever he considers himselfincapable of working has 
grave potentialities. It can be expected that well-organized prisoners of war, 
intent upon creating as many difficulties as possible for the Detaining Power, 
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will be directed by their anonymous leaders to report themselves en masse and 
at frequent intervals as being incapable of working and to request that they be 
permitted to appear before the medical authorities of the camp. Is the Detaining 
Power to be helpless, if thousands of prisoners of war, many more than can be 
examined by available medical personnel, all elect at the same time to claim 
sudden physical unfitness and to demand physical examinations? Where the 
Detaining Power has good grounds for believing that such is the situation, and 
this will normally be quite apparent, it would undoubtedly be justified in 
compelling every prisoner of war to work until his tum for examination is 
reached in regular order with the complement of medical personnel which had 
previously been adequate for the particular prisoner-of-war camp. Thus the act 
of the prisoners of war themselves in attempting to tum a provision intended 
for their protection into an offensive weapon, illegal in its inception, would 
actually result in their causing harm to the very people it was intended to 
protect-the truly physically unfit prisoners of war. 
The suggestion has been made that the medical examinations to determine 
physical fitness for work should preferably be made by the retained medical 
personnel of the Power upon which the prisoners of war depend.33 This 
suggestion is based upon the fact that Article 30, in providing for the medical 
care and treatment of prisoners of war, states that they "shall have the attention, 
preferably, of medical personnel of the Power on which they depend and, if 
possible, of their nationality." However, there is considerable difference between 
permitting the medical personnel of the Power on which the prisoner of war 
depends to render medical assistance when he ill or injured, and permitting such 
personnel to say whether or not he is physically qualified to work. It is not 
believed that any Detaining Power would, or that the Convention intended that 
it should, permit retained medical personnel to make final decisions in this 
34 
regard. 
h. In his Instructions, Lieber gave no indication that the labor of all prisoners 
of war, regardless of rank, was not available to the Detaining Power in some 
capacity. However, Article 25 of the Declaration of Brussels and Article 71 of 
the "Oxford Manual" both provided that prisoners of war could only be 
employed on work which would not be "humiliating to their military rank." 
The Second Hague Convention of1899 reverted to Lieber's rather vague phrase, 
"according to their rank;" and the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 went a 
step further, adding to the foregoing phrase the words "officers excepted," 
thereby giving a legislative basis to a practice which had, in fact, already been 
followed.35 
Both the 1929 Convention and the 1949 Convention are much more specific 
in this regard, the latter amplifying and clarifying the already more detailed 
provisions of its predecessor. While the first paragraph of Article 49 of the 1949 
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Convention authorizes the Detaining Power to utilize the labor of "prisoners 
of war," the second paragraph of that article specifies that non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) may only be required to do supervisory work, and the third 
paragraph states that officers may not be compelled to work. It thus becomes 
clear that, as used in the first paragraph of this article, the term "prisoners of 
war" is intended to refer only to enlisted men below the non-commissioned 
officer grade. 
During World War II several problems arose with respect to the identification 
of non-commissioned officers for labor purposes. In the first place, many NCOs 
had had their identification documents taken from them upon capture (probably 
for intelligence purposes) and were thereafter unable to establish their 
entidement to recognition of their grade.36 On the other hand, a number of 
individuals apparendy claimed NCO grades to which they were not actually 
entided, probably in order to avoid hard labor as well as to be entided to the 
higher advances in pay?7 In a number of respects the 1949 Convention attempts 
to obviate these problems. Thus, Article 21 of the 1929 Convention provided 
only that, upon the outbreak of hostilities, the belligerents would communicate 
to one another the tides and ranks in use in their armies in order to assure 
"equality of treatment between corresponding ranks of officers and persons of 
equivalent status." This was construed as limiting the requirements of this 
exchange of information to the ranks and tides of commissioned officers. Article 
43 of the new Convention makes it clear that information is to be exchanged 
concerning the ranks and tides of all persons who fall within the various 
. f 'al' f d' h C . 38 categones 0 potentl pnsoners 0 war enumerate m t e onventlon. 
Further, during World War II the military personnel of each belligerent carried 
such identification documents, if any, as that belligerent elected to provide to 
its personnel. In addition, as just noted, it was not unusual for capturing personnel 
to seize these documents for whatever intelligence value they might have, 
leaving the prisoner of war with no official identification material. The 1949 
Convention attempts to rectify both of these defects. In Article 17 it provides 
for an identification card containing, as a minimum, certain specified material 
concerning identity; prescribes the desirable type of card; provides that it be 
issued in duplicate; and states that while the prisoner of war must exhibit it upon 
the demand of his captors, under no circumstances may it be taken from him. 
This article, if complied with by the belligerents, should do much to eliminate 
the problem of identifying non-commissioned officers, which existed during 
World War II and which undoubtedly resulted in many incorrect decisions. 
Two other problems connected with the labor of non-commissioned officers 
are worthy of comment. On occasions disputes may arise as to the types of work 
which can be construed as falling within the term "supervisory." The drafters 
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of the 1949 Convention made no attempt to solve this problem. There is much 
merit in the solution offered by one authority, who says: 
The term "supervisory work" is generally recognized as denoting 
administrative tasks which usually consist of directing the other ranks; it obviously 
excludes all manuallabor.39 
The other problem relates to the right of a non-commissioned officer, who 
has exercised the privilege given him under both conventions to request work 
other than supervisory, thereafter to withdraw his request. During World War 
II different practices were followed by the belligerents. Thus GermanJ' gave 
British non-commissioned officers the right to withdraw their requests; 4 while 
the policy of the United States was not to grant such requests for non-supervisory 
work in the first place, unless they were for the duration of captivity in the 
United States.41 It has been urged that, inasmuch as a non-commissioned officer 
is free to undertake non-supervisory work, he should be equally free to 
discontinue such work, subject to the right of the Detaining Power to provide 
him with such employment only if he agrees to work for a fixed term, which 
may be extended upon his request.42 This appears to be a logical and practical 
solution to the problem, although it is probably one to which not every 
belligerent will subscribe. 
Officers cannot be required to do even supervisory work unless they request 
it. Once they have done so, the problems relating to their labor are very similar 
to those relating to the voluntary labor of non-commissioned officers, except 
that they were apparently rather generally permitted to discontinue working 
whenever they decided to do so. In general, the labor of officers has not caused 
·al di . b b lli 43 any mateo ssenSlOn etween e gerents. 
c. Scattered throughout the 1949 Convention are a number of other 
provisions specifically limiting the work which may be required of certain 
categories of enemy personnel, prisoners of war or others, held by a Detaining 
Power. Thus, medically trained personnel who, when captured, were not 
assigned to the medical services in the enemy armed forces and who are, 
therefore, ordinary prisoners of war, may be required to perform medical 
functions for the benefit of their fellow prisoners of war; but if they are so 
required, they are entitled to the treatment accorded retained medical 
personnel44 and are exempted from any other work (Article 32). The same rule 
applies to ministers of religion who were not serving as such when captured 
(Article 36). Prisoners of war assigned to provide essential services in the camps 
of officer prisoners of war may not be required to perform any other work 
(Article 44). And prisoners' representatives may likewise not be required to 
perform any other work, but this restriction applies only "if the accomplishment 
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of their duties is thereby made more difficult" (Article 81). While these various 
provisions are not of very great magnitude in the over-all prisoner-of-war 
picture, they can, of course, be of major importance to the particular individuals 
involved. 
Types of Work Which Prisoners of War May Be Compelled to Perform 
The types of work which prisoners of war may be compelled to perform and 
the industries to which they may be assigned have generated much controversy. 
Long before final agreement was reached thereon at the 1949 Geneva 
Diplomatic Conference, the article of the Convention concerned with the 
subject of authorized labor was termed "the most disputed article in the whole 
Convention, and the most difficult of interpretation.,,45 Unfortunately, it 
appears fairly certain that the agreements ultimately reached in this area are 
destined to magnify, rather than to minimize or eliminate, this problem.46 
The early attempts to draft rules concerning the categories oflabor in which 
prisoners of war could be employed merely authorized their employment on 
"public works which have no direct connection with the operations in the 
theater ofwar,,,47 or stated that the tasks of prisoners of war "shall have nothing 
to do with the military operations. ,,48 The insufficiency of these provisions 
having been demonstrated by the events of World War I, an attempt at 
elaboration was made in drafting the comparable provisions (Article 31) of the 
1929 Convention, in which were included not only prohibitions against the 
employment of prisoners of war on labor having a "direct relation with war 
operations," but also against their employment on several specified types of work 
("manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any kind, or . . . 
transporting material intended for combatant units"). 
During World War II these latter provisions proved no more successful than 
their predecessors in regulating prisoner-of-war labor. The term "direct relation 
\vith war op'erations" once again demonstrated itself to be exceedingly difficult 
to interpret'1-9 in a total war in which practicall~ every economic resource of the 
belligerents is mobilized for military purposes. 0 So each belligerent attempting 
to comply \vith the labor provisions of the 1929 Convention found itself required 
to make a specific determination in all but the very few obvious cases as to 
whether a particular occupation fell within the ambit of the prohibitions. 51 As 
could be expected, there were many disputed decisions. 
In drafting a proposed new convention aimed at obviating the many 
difficulties which had arisen during the two world wars, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross attempted a new approach to the prisoner-of-war 
labor problem. Instead of specifying prohibited areas in broad and general terms, 
as had been the previous practice, leaving to the belligerents, the Protecting 
Powers, and the humanitarian organizations the decision as to whether a specific 
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task was or was not prohibited, it decided to list affinnatively and with 
particularity the categories of labor in which Detaining Powers would be 
pennitted to employ prisoners of war, at least impliedly prohibiting their use in 
any type of work not specifically listed. 52 The International Red Cross 
Conference held at Stockholm in 1948, to which this new approach was 
proposed, accepted the idea of affinnatively specifYing the areas in which 
prisoners of war could be required to work; but, instead of the enumeration of 
specifics which the Committee had prepared, the Conference substituted general 
terms.53 The Committee was highly critical of this action.54 At the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference the United Kingdom proposed the substitution of the 
original proposal in place of that contained in the draft adopted at Stockholm, 
and it was this original text, with certain amendments which will be discussed 
later, which ultimately became Article 50 of the 1949 Convention. 55 While 
there is considerable merit to the new approach, the actual phraseology of the 
article leaves much to be desired. 56 
An analysis of the various provisions contained in Article 50 of the 1949 
Convention and, to the extent possible, a delimitation of the areas covered, or 
probably intended to be covered, by each category of work which a prisoner of 
war may be "compelled" to do,57 and the problems inherent in each, is in order. 
(1) Camp Administration, Installation or Maintenance. This refers to the 
management and operation of the camps established for the prisoners of war 
themselves; in other words, broadly speaking, it constitutes their own 
"housekeeping." Early in World War II the United States divided all 
prisoner-of-war labor into two classes: class one, that related to their own camps; 
and class two, all other. 58 This distinction still appears to be a valid one. It has 
been estimated that the use of prisoners of war in the United States for the 
maintenance and operation of their own camps and of other military 
installations59 constituted their major utilization.60 While this is believed to be 
somewhat of an overstatement, it can be assumed that a very considerable portion 
of them will always be so engaged. However, it can also be assumed that in any 
future major conflict demands for prisoner of-war labor will be so great that 
shortages will exist, requiring that the administration of prisoner-of-war camps 
be conducted on an extremely austere basis. 
(2) Agriculture. This field of prisoner-of-war utilization, with its collateral field 
offood processing, combines with camp administration to account for the labor 
of the great majority of employed prisoners of war.61 There are no restrictions 
imposed by the Convention on the employment of prisoners of war in 
agriculture,62 the fact that the product of their labor may eventually be used in 
the manufacture of a military item or be supplied to and consumed by combat 
troops being too remote to pennit of, or warrant, restrictions. 
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(3) Production or Extraction of Raw Materials. This category of authorized 
compulsory employment includes activities in such industries as mining, logging, 
quarrying, et cetera. It is one of the areas in which problems are constandy arising 
and in which there are frequent disagreements between belligerents as well as 
between Detaining Powers and Protecting Powers or humanitarian 
organizations. Thus, after the conclusion of World War II the International 
Committee of the Red Cross reported that it was called upon to intervene more 
frequendy with respect to prisoners of war who worked in mines than with 
respect to any other problem.63 
Inasmuch as the utilization of prisoners of war in this field has been, and 
continues to be, authorized, the problems which arise usually relate to the 
physical ability of the particular prisoner of war to participate in heavy and 
difficult labor of this nature, and to working conditions, including safety 
precautions and equipment, rather than to the fact of the utilization of prisoners 
of war in the specific industry. The first of these problems has already been 
reviewed and the latter will be discussed at length in the general analysis of that 
specific problem. 
(4) Manufacturing Industries (except Metallurgical, Machinery, and Chemicalj.64 In 
modem days of total warfare and the total mobilization of the economy of 
belligerent nations, it has become increasingly impossible to state with 
positiveness that any particular industry does not have some connection with the 
war effort. Where the degree of such connection is the criterion for determining 
the permissibility of the use of prisoners of war in a particular industry, as it was 
prior to the 1949 Convention, problems and disputes are inevitable. In this 
respect, by authorizing compulsory prisoner-of-war labor in most manufacturing 
industries and by specifically prohibiting it in the three categories of industries 
which will be engaged almost exclusively in war work, the new Convention 
represents a positive and progressive development in the law of war and has 
probably eliminated many potential disputes. 
During World War II the nature of the item manufactured and, to some 
extent, its intended ultimate destination determined whether or not the use of 
prisoners of war in its manufacture was permissible. Thus, in the United States 
it was determined that prisoners of war could be used in the manufacture of 
truck parts, as these had a civilian, as well as a military, application; but that they 
could not be used in the manufacture of tank parts, as these had only a military 
application.65 Under the 1949 Convention neither the nature nor the ultimate 
destination nor the intended use of the item being manufactured is material. All 
motor vehicles fall within the category of "machinery" and prisoners of war 
therefore may not be used in their manufacture. On the other hand, prisoners 
of war may be used in a food processing or clothing factory, even though some, 
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or perhaps all, of the food processed or clothing manufactured may be destined 
for the armed forces of the Detaining Power. 
Two sound bases have been advanced for the decision of the Diplomatic 
Conference to prohibit in its entirety the compelling of prisoners of war to work 
in the metallurgical, machinery, and chemical industries: first, that in any general 
war these three categories ofindustries will unquestionably be totally mobilized 
and will be used exclusively for the armaments industry; and second, that 
factories engaged in these industries will be key objectives of enemy air (and 
now of enemy rocket and missile) operations and would, therefore, subject the 
prisoners of war to military action from which they are entitled to be isolated.66 
The Diplomatic Conference apparently balanced this total, industry-wide 
prohibition of compulsory labor in the three specified industries against the 
general authorization to use prisoners of war in every other type of 
manufacturing without requiring the application of any test to determine its 
relationship to the war effort. 
It should be borne in mind that the prohibition under discussion is directed 
only against compelling prisoners of war to work in the specified industries. (As 
we shall see, by inverted phraseology, subparagraphs b, c, and f of Article 50 also 
prohibit the Detaining Power from compelling them to do certain other types 
of work where such work has "military character or purpose.") The question 
then arises as to whether they may volunteer for employment in those industries. 
Based upon the discussions at the Diplomatic Conference,67 it clearly appears 
that the prohibitions contained in Article 50 are not absolute in character and 
that a prisoner of war may volunteer to engage in the prohibited employments, 
just as he is affirmatively authorized by Article 52 to volunteer for labor which 
is "of an unhealthy or dangerous nature." The problem will, of course, arise of 
assuring that the prisoner of war is a true volunteer and that neither mental 
coercion nor physical force has been used to "persuade" him to volunteer to 
work in the otherwise prohibited field of labor. 68 However, the fact that this 
particular problem is difficult of solution (and that the possibility undoubtedly 
exists that some prisoners of war will be coerced into "volunteering") cannot 
be permitted to justify an incorrect interpretation of these provisions of the 
Convention, as to which the indisputable intent of the Diplomatic Conference 
is clearly evidenced by the travaux preparatoires. 
(5) Public Works and Building Operations Which Have No Military Character or 
Purpose. With respect to this portion of the subparagraph, it is first necessary to 
determine the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase "military character or 
purpose." This is no easy task.69 Because the term defies definition in the 
ordinary sense, it will be necessary to define by example. Moreover, the 
discussions at the Diplomatic Conference, unfortunately, provide little that is 
helpful on this problem. 
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A structure such as a fortification clearly has, solely and exclusively, a "military 
character." Conversely, a structure such as a bowling alley clearly has, solely and 
exclusively, a civilian character. The fortification is intended for use in military 
operations; hence it has not only a "military character" but also a "military 
purpose." The bowling alley is intended for exercise and entertainment; hence 
it does not have a "military purpose," even if some or all of the individuals using 
it will be members of the armed forces.7o 
These examples have been comparatively black and white. Unfortunately, as 
is not unusual, there is also a large gray area. This is especially true of the term 
"military purpose." A structure will usually be clearly military or clearly civilian 
in character; but whether its purpose is military or civilian will not always be so 
easy of determination. A sewer is obviously civilian in character, and the fact 
that it is to be constructed between a military installation and the sewage disposal 
plant does not give it a military purpose. On the other hand, a road is likewise 
civilian in character, but a road leading only from a military airfield to a bomb 
dump would certainly have a military purpose. And a theater is civilian in 
character, but if it is a part of a military school installation and is to be used 
exclusively or primarily for the showing of military training films, then it, too, 
would have a military purpose. However, a theater which is intended solely for 
entertainment purposes, like the bowling alley, retains its civilian purpose, even 
though the audience will be largely military. 
To summarize, if the public works or building operations clearly have a 
military character, prisoners of war may not be compelled to work thereon; if 
they do not have a military character, but are being undertaken exclusively or 
primarily for a military use, then they will usually have a military purpose and 
again prisoners of war may not be compelled to work thereon; while if they do 
not have a military character and are not being built exclusively or primarily for 
a military use, then they have neither military character nor purpose, and 
prisoners of war may be compelled to work thereon, even though there may be 
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Having determined, insofar as is possible, the meaning of the phrase "military 
character or purpose," let us apply it to some of the problems which have 
heretofore arisen. Although the use of compulsory prisoner-of-war labor in the 
construction of fortifications has long been considered improper,72 after World 
War II a United States Military Tribunal at Niimberg found "uncertainty" in 
the law, and held such labor not obviously illegal where "it was ordered b~ 
superior authority and was not required to be performed in dangerous areas.7 
Under the 1949 Convention such a decision would clearly be untenable. A 
fortification is military in character and the use of compulsory prisoner-of-war 
labor in its construction is prohibited, no matter what the circumstances or 
location may be. The same is, of course, true of other construction of a uniquely 
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military character such as ammunition dumps, firing ranges, tank obstacles, et 
cetera. On the other hand, bush clearance and the construction of firebreaks in 
wooded areas far from the battle fronts, the digging of drainage ditches,74 the 
buildin~ oflocal air-raid shelters,75 and the clearing of bomb rubble from city 
streets 6 are typical of the categories of public works and building operations 
which have neither military character nor purpose. 
If the foregoing discussion has added but little light to the problem, it is hoped 
that it has, at least, focused attention on an area which can be expected to produce 
considerable controversy; and here, too, the problem will be further complicated 
by the question of volunteering. 
(6) Transportation and Handling cif Stores Which Are Not Military in Character or 
Purpose. Article 31 of the 1929 Convention prohibited the use of prisoners of 
war for "transporting arms or munitions of any kind, or for transporting material 
intended for combatant units." The comparable provisions of the 1949 
Convention clarify this in some respects and obscure it in others. 
The former provision created problems in the determination of the point of 
time at which material became "intended" for a combatant unit and of the nature 
of a "combatant unit." These problems have now been eliminated, the ultimate 
destination of the material transported or handled no longer being decisive. 
Creating new difficulties is the fact that the problem of the application of the 
amorphous term "military in character or purpose" is presented once again. 
Apparently a prisoner of war may now be compelled to work in a factory 
manufacturing military uniforms or gas masks or camouflage netting, as these 
items are neither made by the three prohibited manufacturing industries nor is 
their military character or purpose material; but once manufactured, a prisoner 
of war may not be compelled to load them on a truck or freight car, as they 
probably have a military character and they certainly have a military purpose. 
Conversely, prisoners of war may not be compelled to work in a factory making 
barbed wire, inasmuch as such a factory is in the metallurgical industry; but they 
may be compelled to handle and transport it where it is destined for use on farms 
or ranches, as it would have no military character or purpose. Surely, the 
Diplomatic Conference intended no such inconsistent results, but it is difficult 
to justify any other conclusions. 
Just as was determined with respect to public works and building operations, 
it is extremely doubtful that the ultimate destination or intended use of the stores 
is, alone, sufficient to give them a military character or purpose. Thus, agriculture 
and food processing are, as has been seen, authorized categories of compulsory 
labor for prisoners of war. The food grown and processed obviously has no 
military character; and the fact that it will ultimately be consumed by members 
of the armed forces, even in a battle area, does not give it a military purpose. 
Accordingly, prisoners of war may be compelled to handle and transport such 
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stores. The same reasoning would apply to blankets and sleeping bags, to tents 
and tarpaulins, to socks and soap. 
In this general category, again, the prohibition is only against compulsion, 
and the prisoner of war who volunteers may be assigned to the work of 
transporting and handling stores, even though they have a military character or 
purpose. And, once again, the problem will arise of assuring that the prisoner of 
war has actually volunteered for the work to which he is assigned. 
(7) Commercial Business, and Arts and Crafts. It is doubtful whether very many 
prisoners of war will be given the opportunity to engage in commercial business. 
The prisoner-of-war barber, tailor, shoemaker, cabinetmaker, et cetera, will 
usually be assigned to ply his trade within the prisoner-of-war camp, for the 
benefit of his fellow prisoners of war as a part of the camp activities and 
administration. However, it is conceivable that in some locales they might be 
permitted to set up their own shops or to engage in their trades as employees of 
civilian shops owned by citizens of the Detaining Power. 
That prisoners of war will be permitted to engage in the arts and crafts is 
much more likely. No prisoner-of-war camp has ever lacked artists, both 
professional and amateur, who produce paintings, wood carvings, metal objects, 
et cetera, which find a ready market, through the prisoner-of-war canteen, 
among the military and civilian population of the Detaining Power. However, 
normally this category of work will be done on spare time as a remunerative 
type of hobby, rather than as assigned labor. 
(8) Domestic Service. The specific inclusion of this category of labor merely 
permits the continuation of a practice which was rather generally followed 
during World War II and which has rarely caused any difficulty, inasmuch as 
domestic services have, of course, never been construed as having a "direct 
relation with operations of war." As long as the domestic services are not required 
to be performed in an area where the prisoner of war will be exposed to the fire 
of the combat zone, which is specifically prohibited by Article 23 of the 1949 
Convention, the type of establishment in which he is compelled to perform the 
domestic service, and whether military or civilian, is not material. 
(9) Public Utility Services Having No Military Character or PU1pose. This is the 
third and final usage in Article 50 of the term "military character or purpose." 
Its use here is particularly inept, inasmuch as it is difficult to see how public 
utility services such as gas, electricity, water, telephone, telegraph, et cetera, can, 
under any circumstances, be deemed to have a military character.77 With respect 
to military purpose, the conclusions previously reached are equally applicable 
here. If the utility services are intended exclusively or primarily for military use, 
they will have a military purpose and the Detaining Power is prohibited from 
compelling prisoners of war to work on them. Normally, however, the same 
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public utility services will be used to support both military and civilian activities 
and personnel and will not have a military purpose. 
(10) Unhealthy, Dangerous, or Humiliating LAbor. Article 52 of the 1949 
Convention contains special provisions with respect to labor which is unhealthy, 
dangerous, or humiliating. These tenns are not defined and it may be anticipated 
that their application will cause some difficulties and controversies. Nevertheless, 
the importance of the provision cannot be gainsaid. 
Employing a prisoner of war on unhealthy or dangerous work is prohibited 
"unless he be a volunteer." Assigning a prisoner of war to labor which would be 
considered humiliating for a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power 
is prohibited. No differences can be perceived to have resulted from the use of 
the verb "employed on" in the first instance and "assigned to" in the second. 
Accordingly, it is believed that the omission of the clause "unless he be a 
volunteer" in the case of "humiliating" labor would preclude a prisoner of war 
from volunteering for labor which is considered to be of a humiliating nature 
and that such a clause would be mere surplusage. However, this is probably not 
so. 
Article 32 of the 1929 Convention forbade "unhealthful or dangerous work." 
In construing this provision the United States applied three separate criteria: 
first, the inherent nature of the job (mining, quarrying, logging, et cetera); 
second, the conditions under which it was to be performed (under a tropical 
sun, in a tropical rain, in a millpond in freezing weather, et cetera); and third, 
the individual capacity of the prisoner of war. 78 These criteria would be equally 
relevant in aEplying the substantially similar provisions of Article 52 of the 1949 
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It is quite apparent that there are criteria available for determining whether 
a particular job is unhealthy or dangerous and is, therefore, one upon which 
prisoners of war may not be employed. Nevertheless, there will undoubtedly 
be some borderline cases in which disputes may well arise as to the utilization 
of non-volunteer prisoners of war. However, there unquestionably will be more 
jobs in clearly permissible categories than there will be prisoners of war available 
to fill them. Accordingly, the Detaining Power, which is attempting to handle 
prisoners of war stricdy in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, 
can easily avoid disputes by not using prisoners of war on labor of a controversial 
character. 
The third paragraph of Article 52 specifies that "the removal of mines or 
similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labor." By this simple statement 
the Diplomatic Conference, after one of its most heated and lengthy 
discussions,80 made it completely clear that the employment of prisoners of war 
on mine removal is prohibited unless they are volunteers. The compulsory use 
of prisoners of war on this type of work was one of the most bothersome 
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problems of prisoner-of-war utilization of World War II, particularly after the 
termination of hostilities. 
The application of the prohibition against the assignment of prisoners of war 
to work considered humiliating for members of the armed forces of the 
Detaining Power should cause few difficulties.81 Certainly the existence or 
non-existence of a custom or rule in this regard in the armed forces of the 
Detaining Power should rarely be a mater of controversy.82 It is probable that, 
in the main, problems in this area will arise because the standard adopted is that 
applied in the armed forces of the Detaining Power rather than that applied in 
the armed forces of the Power upon which the prisoners of war depend. While 
this decision was indubitably the only one which the Diplomatic Conference 
could logically have reached, it is not unlikely that prisoners of war will find this 
difficult to understand and that there will be tasks which they consider to be 
humiliating, even though the members of the armed forces of the Detaining 
Power do not, particularly where the prisoners of war come from a nation having 
a high standard of living and are held by a Detaining Power which has a 
considerably lower standard. 
Conditions of Employment 
We have so far considered the two aspects of prisoner-of-war labor which 
are peculiar to that status: who may be compelled to work; and the fields of 
work in which they may be employed. Our discussion now enters the area in 
which most nations have laws governing the general conditions of employment 
of their own civilian citizens-laws which, as we shall see, are often applicable 
to the employment of prisoners of war. 
General Working Conditions. Article 51 of the Convention constitutes a fairly 
broad code covering working conditions. Its first paragraph provides that: 
Prisoners of war must be granted suitable working conditions, especially as 
regards accommodation, food, clothing and equipment; such conditions shall not 
be inferior to those enjoyed by nationals of the Detaining Power employed in 
similar work; account shall also be taken of climatic conditions. 
These provisions, several of which derive direcdy from adverse experiences of 
World War II, are, for the most part, so elementary as to require litde exploratory 
discussion. However, one major change in basic philosophy is worthy of note. 
The 1929 Convention provided, in Articles 10 and 11, that the minimum 
standard for accommodations and food for prisoners of war should be that 
provided for "troops at base camps of the detaining Power." This standard was 
equally applicable to working prisoners of war. Article 25 of the 1949 
Convention contains an analogous provision with respect to accommodations 
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for prisoners of war generally-but the quotation from Article 51 given above 
makes it abundandy clear that, as to the lodging, food, clothing, and equipment 
of working prisoners of war, the minimum standard is no longer that of base 
troops of the Detaining Power, but is that of "nationals of the Detaining Power 
employed in similar work. " While this represents a continuation of adherence 
to a national standard, it is probable that the new national standard will be higher 
than the one previously used, inasmuch as workers are frequendy a favored class 
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With regard to a somewhat similar provision contained in the second 
paragraph of the same article, less optimism appears to be warranted. This 
paragraph, making applicable to working prisoners of war "the national 
legislation concerning the protection of labor and, more particularly, the 
regulations for the safety of workers," was the result of a proposal made by the 
U.S.S.R. at the Diplomatic Conference, which received the immediate support 
of the United States and others.84 This support was undoubtedly premised on 
the assumption that, if adopted, the proposal would increase the protection 
afforded to working prisoners of war. Second thoughts indicate that this 
provision may constitute a basis for reducing the protection which it was 
intended to afford prisoners of war engaged in dangerous employments. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross has found it necessary to point out 
that national standards may not here be applied in such a way as to reduce the 
minimum standards established by the Convention.85 It now appears 
unfortunate that the Diplomatic Conference adopted the U.S.S.R. proposal 
rather than the suggestion of the representative of the International Labor 
Organization that it be guided by the internationally accepted standards of safen: 
for workers contained in international labor conventions then already in being.86 
Moreover, the safety laws and regulations are not the only safety measures which 
are tied to national standards. The third paragraph of Article 51 requires that 
prisoners of war receive training and protective equipment appropriate to the 
work in which they are to be emRloyed "and similar to those accorded to the 
nationals of the Detaining Power. ,,87 This same paragraph likewise provides that 
prisoners of war "may be submitted to the normal risks run by these civilian 
workers." Inasmuch as the test as to what are "normal risks" is based upon the 
national standards of the Detaining Power, this provision, too, would appear to 
be a potential breeding ground for disagreement and dispute, particularly as the 
"normal risks" which civilian nationals of the Detaining Power may be called 
upon to undergo under the pressures of a wartime economy ,vill probably bear 
litde relationship to the risks permitted under normal conditions. 
The reference to the climatic conditions under which the labor is performed, 
contained in the portion of Article 51 quoted above, is one of the provisions 
deriving from the experiences of World War H.88 The 1929 Convention 
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provided, in Article 9, that prisoners of war captured "where the climate is 
injurious for persons coming from temperate climates, shall be transported, as 
soon as possible, to a more favorable climate." It is well known that in a large 
number of cases this was not done. The 1949 Convention contains a somewhat 
similar general provision (in Article 22) concerning evacuation; but it was 
recognized that, despite the best of intentions, belligerents will not always be in 
a position to arrange the immediate evacuation of prisoners of war from the 
areas in which they are captured. Accordingly, the Diplomatic Conference 
wrote into the Convention the quoted additional admonition with respect to 
climatic conditions and prisoner-of-war labor. It follows that, where a Detaining 
Power cannot, at least for the time being, evacuate prisoners of war from an 
unhealthy climate, whether tropical or arctic, it must, if it desires to utilize the 
labor of the prisoners of war in that area even temporarily, make due allowances 
for the climate, giving them proper clothing,89 the necessary protection from 
the elements, appropriate working periods, et cetera. 
Article 51 of the 1949 Convention concludes with a prohibition against 
rendering working conditions more arduous as a disciplinary measure. 90 In other 
words, the standards for working conditions, be they international or national, 
established by the Convention may not be disregarded in the administration of 
disciplinary punishment to a prisoner of war, and it is immaterial whether the 
act for which he is being punished occurred in connection with, or completely 
apart from, his work. Thus, a Detaining Power may not lower safety standards, 
avoid requirements for protective equipment, lengthen working hours, 
withhold required extra rations, et cetera, as punishment for misbehavior. On 
the other hand, "fatigue details" of not more than two hours a day, or the 
withdrawal of extra privileges, both of which are authorized as disciplinary 
punishment, undoubtedly could be imposed, as they obviously do not fall within 
the terms of the prohibition; and the extra rations to which prisoners of war are 
entitled under Article 26, when they are engaged in heavy manual labor, could 
undoubtedly be withheld from a prisoner of war who refuses to work, inasmuch 
as he would no longer meet the requirement for entitlement to such extra rations. 
In the usual arrangement contemplated by the Convention for the utilization 
of the labor of prisoners of war, the prisoners, each working day, go from their 
camp to their place of employment, returning to the camp upon the completion 
of their working period. However, another arrangement is authorized by the 
Convention. Thus, where the place at which the work to be accomplished is 
too far from any prisoner-of-war camp to permit the daily round trip, a so-called 
"labor detachment" may be established.91 These labor detachments, which were 
widely used during World War II, are merely miniature prisoner-of-war camps, 
established in order to meet more conveniently a specific labor requirement. 
Article 56 of the 1949 Convention requires that it be organized and administered 
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in the same manner as, and as a part of, a prisoner-of-war camp. Prisoners of 
war making up a labor detachment are entitled to all the rights, privileges, and 
protections which are available under the Convention to prisoners of war 
assigned to, and living in, a regular prisoner-of-war camp.92 However, the fact 
that local conditions render it impossible to make a labor detachment an exact 
replica of a prisoner-of-war camp does not necessarily indicate a violation of the 
Convention. As long as the provisions of the Convention are observed with 
respect to the particular labor detachment, it must be considered to be properly 
constituted and operated.93 
One other point with respect to labor detachments is worthy of note. While 
Article 39 requires that prisoner-of-war camps be under the "immediate 
authority of a responsible commissioned officer belonging to the regular armed 
forces of the Detaining Power," there is no such requirement as to labor 
detachments. Although each labor detachment is under the authority of the 
military commander of the prisoner-of-war camp on which it depends, who 
will, of course, be a commissioned officer, there appears to be no prohibition 
against the assignment of a non-commissioned officer as the immediate 
commander. In view of the large number of labor detachments which will 
probably be established by each belligerent, it is safe to assume that the great 
majority of them will be under the supervision of non-commissioned officers. 
A situation under which the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor will usually, 
although not necessarily, require the establishment oflabor detachments is where 
they are employed by private individuals or business organizations. This is the 
method by which most of the many prisoners of war engaged in agriculture will 
probably be administered. During World War II, prisoners of war performing 
labor under these circumstances were frequently denied the basic living standards 
guaranteed to them by the 1929 Convention. Article 57 of the 1949 Convention 
specifically provides, not only that the treatment of prisoners of war working 
for private employers "shall not be inferior to that which is provided for by the 
present Convention," but also that the Detaining Power, its military authorities, 
and the commander of the prisoner-of-war camp to which the prisoners belong, 
all continue to be responsible for their maintenance, care, and treatment; and 
that these prisoners of war have the right to communicate with the prisoners' 
representative in the prisoner-of-war camp.94 It remains to be seen whether the 
changes made in the provisions of the applicable intemationallegislation will be 
successful in accomplishing their purpose. 
One problem which may arise in the use of prisoner-of-war labor by private 
employers is that of guarding the prisoners of war. Frequently, the Detaining 
Power will provide military personnel to guard such prisoners of war. When it 
does so, the problems presented are no different from those which arise at the 
prisoner-of-war camp itsel£ If paroles have been given to and accepted by the 
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prisoners of war concerned, there are likewise no problems peculiar to the 
situation.95 But suppose that civilian guards are used. What authority do they 
have to compel a prisoner of war to work ifhe refuses to do so? Or to prevent 
a prisoner of war from escaping? And to what extent may they use force on 
prisoners of war? 
If a prisoner of war assigned to work for a private employer refuses to do so, 
the proper action to take would unquestionably be to notify the military 
commander of the prisoner-of-war camp to which he belongs. The latter is in 
a position to have an independent investigation made and to impose disciplinary 
or judicial punishment, if and as appropriate. 
If a prisoner of war assigned to work for a private employer who is not 
provided with military guards attempts to escape, the authority of the civilian 
guards is extremely limited. That they may use reasonable force, short offirearms, 
seems fairly clear. That the guards may use firearms to prevent the escape is 
highly questionable.96 Detaining Powers would be well advised not to assign 
any prisoner of war to this type oflabor, where he is to be completely unguarded 
or guarded only by civilians, unless the prisoner of war has accepted parole, or 
unless the Detaining Power has evaluated the likelihood of attempted escape by 
the particular prisoner of war and has determined to take a calculated risk in his 
case. 
It would not be appropriate to leave the subject of conditions of employment 
without at least passing reference to the possibility of special agreements in this 
field between the opposing belligerents. Strangely enough, despite the fact that 
prisoner-of-war labor has been the subject of special agreements (or of attempts 
to negotiate special agreements) between opposing bellirerents on a number of 
occasions during both World War I and World War II,9 and despite numerous 
references elsewhere in the 1949 Convention to the possibility of special 
agreements, nowhere in the articles of the Convention concerned with 
prisoner-of-war labor is there any reference made to this subject. Nevertheless, 
such agreements, provided that they do not adversely affect the rights of prisoners 
of war, may be negotiated under the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention, 
as well as under the inherent sovereign rights of the belligerents.98 
Working Hours, Holidays, and Vacations. Article 53 of the 1949 Convention 
covers all aspects of the time periods of prisoner-of-war labor. As to the duration 
of daily work, it provides that (1) this must not be excessive; (2) it must not 
exceed the work hours for civilians in the same district; (3) travel time to and 
from the job must be included; and (4) a rest of at least one hour Qonger, if 
civilian nationals receive more) must be allowed in the middle of the day. 
It thus appears that the new Convention contains the same prohibition as its 
predecessor against daily labor which is of "excessive" duration. Here, again, we 
have the application of the national standard, and in an area in which such 
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standard had proved to be disadvantageous to prisoners of war during World 
War 11.99 The Greek Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference attempted to 
obtain the establishment of an international standard--a maximum of eight hours 
a day for all work except agriculture, where a maximum of ten hours would 
have been authorized. This proposal was overwhelmingly rejected. lOO As has 
already been pointed out with regard to other problems, where a national rather 
than an international standard has been adopted, very few nations at war could 
afford to grant to prisoners of war more favorable working conditions than those 
accorded their own civilian citizens. lOl With respect to hours of daily work, it 
must be noted, too, that the limitations contained in the article cannot be 
circumvented by the adoption of piece work, or some other task system, in lieu 
of a specific number of working hours. The Convention specifically prohibits 
rendering the length of the working day excessive by the use of this method.102 
The provision for a midday rest of a minimum of one hour is new and is only 
subject to the national standard if the latter is more favorable to the prisoner of 
war than the international standard established by the Convention. It may be 
necessary for the Detaining Power to increase the midday rest period given to 
prisoners of war, if its own civilian workers receive a rest period in excess of 
one hour, but it may not, under any circumstances, be shortened to less than 
one hour. 
Article 53 further provides that prisoners of war shall be entitled to a 24-hour 
holiday every week, preferably on Sunday "or the day of rest in their country 
of origin." Except for the quoted material, which was adopted at the request of 
Israel but which should be of equal importance to the pious Moslem, a similar 
provision was contained in the 1929 Convention. This provision is not subject 
to national standards, whether or not the national standard is more liberal.103 
And finally, this same article grants to every prisoner of war who has worked 
for one year a vacation of eight consecutive days with pay. This provision is new 
and is of a nature to create minor problems, as, for example, whether nonnal 
days of rest are excluded from the computation of the eight days, what activity 
is permitted to the prisoner of war during his "vacation," and what he may be 
required to do during this period. However, despite these administrative 
problems, the provision should prove a boon to every person who undergoes a 
lengthy period of detention as a prisoner of war. 
Compensation and Other Monetary Benefits. The 1929 Convention provided, 
in Article 34, that prisoners of war would be "entitled to wages to be fixed by 
agreements between the belligerents." No such agreements were, in fact, ever 
concluded.104 The comparable provision of the 1949 Convention (Article 62) 
provides for "working pay" lOS in an amount to be fixed by the Detaining Power, 
which may not be less than one-fourth of one Swiss franc for a full working 
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day.106 The amount so fixed must be "fair" and the prisoners of war must be 
informed of it, as must the Protecting Power. 
With regard to the establishment by the Detaining Power of a "fair working 
rate of pay," several matters should be noted. First, no basis can be seen for 
attempting to determine what is "fair" by endeavoring to compare the "working 
pay" of prisoners of war with the wages of civilian workers. There are too many 
diverse and unequal factors involved;107 and the extremely nominal minimum 
set by the Convention is clearly indicative of the fact that there was no intention 
on the part of the Diplomatic Conference to establish any such relationship. 
Second, while there appears to be nothing to preclude a Detaining Power from 
establishing a fair basic "working rate of pay," and then providing for amounts 
in addition thereto for work requiring superior skill or heavier exertion or greater 
exposure to danger, or as a production incentive, no authority exists for 
establishing different working rates of pay for prisoners of war of different 
nationalities who have the same competence and are engaged in the same types 
of work. lOS And finally, the rate established as "fair" may not thereafter be 
administratively reduced by having a part of it "retained" by the camp 
administration. The authority for this procedure, which was contained in Article 
34 of the 1929 Convention, has been specifically and intentionally deleted from 
the 1949 Convention. 
There is one provision of the new Convention which could render this entire 
subject moot. An individual account must be kept for each prisoner of war. All 
of the funds to which he becomes enticled during the period of his captivity, 
including his working pay, are credited to this account and all of the payments 
made on his behalf or at his request are deducted therefrom (Article 64). Under 
Article 34 of the 1929 Convention it then became the obligation of the 
Detaining Power to deliver to the prisoner of war "the pay remaining to his 
credit" at the end of his captivity. Under Article 66 of the 1949 Convention, 
upon the termination of the captivity of a prisoner of war, it will be the 
responsibility of the Power in whose armed forces he was serving at the time of 
his capture, and not of the Detaining Power, to setcle any balance due him. Under 
these circumstances, there appears to be litcle reason why a Detaining Power 
should not be extremely generous in establishing its "fair working rate of pay." 
In effect, it will, for the most part, merely be creating a future liability on the 
part of its enemy! This factor may result in the negotiation of agreements 
between belligerents fixing mutually acceptable "working rates of pay," despite 
the lack of a specific provision for such agreements in the 1949 
Convention-agreements which, as has been noted, were not reached under 
the 1929 Convention where there was specific provision for them. 
A number of changes have been embodied in the 1949 Convention with 
regard to the types of work which enticle a prisoner of war to working pay. Of 
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major importance is the fact that, while Article 34 of the 1929 Convention 
specifically provided that "prisoners of war shall not receive wages for work 
connected with the administration, management and maintenance of the 
[prisoner-of-war] camps," Article 62 of the present Convention is equally 
specific that prisoners of war "permanendy detailed to duties or to a skilled or 
semi-skilled occupation in connection with the administration, installation or 
maintenance of camps" will be entided to working pay. This article also contains 
a specific provision under which non-medical service medical personnel (Article 
32), and retained medical personnel and chaplains (Article 33) are entided to 
working pay. And while the prisoners' representative and his advisers are, 
primarily, paid out of canteen funds, if there are no such funds, these individuals, 
too, are entided to working pay from the Detaining Power. Finally, because 
enlisted men assigned as orderlies in officers' camps are specifically exempted 
from performing any other work (Article 44), it af8ears that they should be 
entided to working pay from the Detaining Power. 9 
What of the prisoner of war who is the victim of an industrial accident or 
contracts an industrial disease and is thereby incapacitated, either temporarily or 
permanendy? Does he receive any type of compensation, and, ifso, what, when, 
from whom, and how? 
The Regulations attached to the Second Hague Convention of1899 and to 
the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 were silent on this problem. The 
multilateral prisoner-of-war agreement negotiated at Copenhagen in 1917 
adopted a Russian proposal which placed upon the Detaining Power the same 
responsibility in this regard that it had towards its own citizens; but the 
British-German agreement, which was negotiated at The Hague in 1918, 
provided merely that the Detaining Power should provide the injured prisoner 
of war with a certificate as to his occupational injury.11° The procedure adopted 
at Copenhagen was subsequendy incorporated in Article 27 of the 1929 
Convention, and in 1940, after some abortive negotiations with the British, 
Germany enacted a law implementing this procedure.1ll The United States 
subsequendy established this same policy,112 but the United Kingdom 
considered that it was only required to fumish the injured prisoner of war all 
required medical and other care.113 
Inasmuch as no payments were ever, in fact, made to injured prisoners of war 
by the Detaining Powers after their repatriation,114 it is not surprising that in 
drafting the pertinent provisions of the 1949 Convention the Diplomatic 
Conference replaced the 1929 procedure with one more nearly resembling that 
which had been adopted by the British and Germans at The Hague in 1918.115 
It may actually be asserted that there is litde difference between the previous 
practice and the present policy. 
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The procedure established by the 1949 Convention is contained in the 
somewhat overlapping provisions of Articles 54 and 68. When a prisoner of 
war sustains an injury as a result of an industrial accident (or incurs an 
industrial disease), the Detaining Power has the obligation of providing him 
with all required care, medical, hospital, and general maintenance during the 
period of his disability and continuation in the status of a prisoner of war.116 
The only other obligation of the Detaining Power is to provide the prisoner 
of war with a statement, properly certified, "showing the nature of the injury 
or disability, the circumstances in which it arose and particulars of medical 
or hospital treatment." Also, a copy of this statement must be sent to the 
Central Prisoners of War Agency. This latter action insures its permanent 
availability. 
If the prisoner of war desires to make a claim for compensation while still in 
that status, he may do so, but his claim will be addressed, not to the Detaining 
Power, but to the Power on which he depends and will be transmitted to it 
through the medium of the Protecting Power.117 The Convention makes no 
provision for the procedure to be followed beyond this point, probably for the 
reason that the problem is a domestic one which would be inappropriate for 
inclusion in an international convention. Nevertheless, it may well be that, in 
the long run, the present policy, by transferring responsibility to the Power upon 
which he depends, upon the repatriation of the prisoner of war, will prove of 
more value to the disabled prisoner of war than the apparendy more generous 
policy expressed in the 1929 Convention. llS 
Grievance Procedures. In general, any prisoner of war who believes that the 
rights guaranteed to him by the 1949 Convention are, in any manner 
whatsoever, being violated in connection with his utilization as a source oflabor, 
would have the right to avail himself of any of the channels of complaint 
established by the Convention: to the representatives of the Protecting Power 
(Articles 78 and 126); to the prisoners' representative (Articles 78, 79, and 81); 
and, perhaps, to representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(Articles 9, 79, 81, and 126).119 Nevertheless, the Diplomatic Conference felt 
it advisable to include in Article 50 (which lists the classes of authorized labor) 
a specific provision permitting prisoners of war to exercise their right of 
complaint, should they consider that a particular work assignment is in a 
prohibited industry. It is somewhat difficult to perceive the necessity for this 
provision or that it adds anything to the general protection otherwise accorded 
to the prisoner of war by the appropriate provisions of the Convention. In fact, 
the danger always exists that by this specific provision the draftsmen may have 
unwittingly diluted the effect of the general protective provisions in areas where 
no specific provision has been included. 
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Conclusion 
Utilization of prisoner-of-war labor means increased availability of manpower 
and a reduction in disciplinary problems for the Detaining Power, and an active 
occupation, better health and morale, and, perhaps, additional purchasing power 
for the prisoners of war. It is obvious that both sides will have much to gain if 
all of the belligerents comply with the labor provisions of the 1949 Convention. 
On the whole, it is believed that these labor provisions represent an 
improvement in the protection to be accorded prisoners of war in any future 
conflict. True, they contain ambiguities and compromises which can serve any 
belligerent which is so minded as a basis for justifying the establishment of policies 
which are contrary to the best interests of the prisoners of war detained by it 
and which are probably contrary to the intent of the drafters. However, it must 
be assumed that nations which have ratified or adhered to the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, many of which 
were likewise involved in its drafting, will, to the maximum extent within their 
capabilities, implement it as the humanitarian charter which it was intended to 
be. And, in any event, two factors are always present which tend to call forth 
this type of implementation: the presence of the Protecting Power and the 
d · f . . 120 I-r.· h· . d octnne 0 reclproclty. IllormatlOn as to t e mterpretatlon an 
implementation of the Convention by a belligerent is made known to the other 
side through the Protecting Powers and thus becomes public knowledge with 
the resulting effect, good or bad, on world public opinion. Policies which, while 
perhaps complying with a strict interpretation of the Convention, are obviously 
overly restrictive in an area where a more humanitarian attitude appears justified 
and could easily be employed, will undoubtedly result in the adoption of an 
equally or even more restrictive policy by the opposing belligerent. Such 
retorsion can easily lead to charges of reprisals, which are outlawed, and thus 
create a situation which, whether or not justified, can only result in harm to all 
of the prisoners of war held by both sides. While there were nations which, 
during World War II, appeared to be disinterested in the effect that their 
treatment of prisoners of war was having on the treatment received by their own 
personnel detained by the enemy, it is to be hoped that in any future war, even 
hi h h "d . f ·d 1 ,,121 h 1 one w c represents t e estructlon 0 an 1 eo ogy, at t e very east, 
concern for the fate of its own personnel will cause each belligerent to apply the 
doctrine pacta sunt servanda scrupulously in establishing policies which 
implement, among others, the labor provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War 
Convention of 1949. 
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As submitted by Committee II (prisoners of War) to the Plenary Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference, it 
read: 
" ••• manufacturing industries, with the exception ofiron and steel, machinery and chemical industries 
and of public works, and building operations which have a military character or purpose" (2A Final Record 
585-586). Although this portion of Art. 50 was approved by the Plenary Assembly without amendment, in 
the Final Act of the Conference (which is, of course, the official, signed version of the Convention), the same 
provision reads: 
" ••• manufacturing industries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical industries; 
public works and building operations which have no military character or purpose" (1 Final Record 254). 
These changes in wording and punctuation (made in the English version only) represent a considerable 
clarification and should eliminate many disputes which might otherwise have arisen. However, it would be 
interesting to know their origin! 
65. Lewis, History 77. After World War II one of the U. S. Military Tribunals at Nuernberg held: 
" ••• as a matter oflaw that it is illegal to use prisoners of war in armament factories and factories engaged 
in the manufacture of airplanes for use in the war effort." The Milch Case (U. S. v. Erhard Milch), note 25 
above, at 867. The decision would, in part, probably have been otherwise had the defense been able to show 
that the airplanes were intended exclusively for civilian use. 
66. Pictet, Commentary 268-269. 
67. As indicated in note 57 above, the decision to use the words "compelled to" in the first sentence of 
Art. 50 was reached only after the consideration and rejection of numerous alternatives. Words such as 
"prisoners of war may only be employed in" were strongly urged because they would preclude the Detaining 
Power from using pressure to induce prisoners of war to "volunteer" for work which they could not be 
compelled to do (2A Final Record 343); and words such as "prisoners of war may be obliged to do only" 
("compelled to do only'1 were just as strongly urged on the very ground that the alternative proposal would 
preclude volunteering (ibid. at 342). The proponents of the latter position were successful in having their 
phraseology accepted by the Plenary Assembly. 
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68. See Levie, "Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners of War," 56 AJ.I.L. 433, at 450, note 71 
(1962). The ICRC appears to be inconsistent in asserting that the prohibition against prisoners of war working 
in these industries is absolute (pictet, Commentary 268), but that prisoners of war may volunteer to handle 
stores which are military in character or purpose (ibid. at 278), work which the Detaining Power is likewise 
prohibited from compelling prisoners of war to do. The statement that the absolute prohibition of Art. 7 
against the voluntary renunciation of rights by prisoners of war was necessary "because it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to prove the existence of duress or pressure" (ibid. at 89) is, of course, equally applicable to all of 
the prohibitions of Art. 50, but the Diplomatic Conference obviously elected to take a calculated risk in this 
regard insofar as prisoner-of-war labor is concerned. 
69. In his article (note 45 above, at p. 52), General Dillon showed considerable restraint when he said 
merely that many delegations believed that the phrase "will create some difficulty in future interpretations. " 
He had been much more vehement at the Diplomatic Conference! (2A Final Record 342-343.) 
70. The test is whether it is intended for military use, and not whether it is intended for use by the 
military. A bowling alley or a tennis court or a clubhouse might be intended, perhaps exclusively, for use by 
the military, but such structures certainly have no military use per se and, therefore, they do not have a "military 
purpose." 
71. The foregoing position closely resembles the legal interpretation of the phrase in question proposed 
by the present author and approved by The Judge Advocate General of the United States Army in an 
unpublished opinion written in 1955 OAGW 1955/88). It differs from the ICRC position, which is that 
"everything which is commanded and regulated by the military authority is of a military character, in contrast 
to what is commanded and regulated by the civil authorities." Pictet, Commentary 267. 
72. Flory, op. cit. note 29 above, at 74. 
73. The High Command Case (U. S. v. Wilhelm von Leeb), 11 Trials 534. No such uncertainty existed 
in the minds of the members of the Tribunal with respect to the use of prisoners of war in the construction 
of combat zone field fortifications. Ibid. 538. 
74. Lewis, History 89. 
75. Sec. 738, German Regulations, Compilation of Orders No. 39,July 15,1944. 
76. Pictet, Commentary 267-268, where a distinction is justifiably drawn between clearing debris from 
city streets and clearing it from an important defile used only for military purposes. 
77. In Pietet, Commentary 268, the statement is made that these public utility services have a military 
character "in sectors where they are under military administration." The present writer finds it impossible to 
agree that the nature of the administration of these public services can determine their inherent character. If 
this were possible, then public utility services administered by the military authorities in an occupied area, as 
is normally the case, would be military in character, even though originally constructed for and then being 
used almost exclusively by the civilian population of the occupied tertitory. 
78. Lewis, History 112; MacKnight, loco cit. note 31 above, at 55. The latter continues with the following 
statement: 
" .•. The particular task is considered, not the industry as a whole. The specific conditions attending 
each job are decisive. For example, an otherwise dangerous task may be made safe by the use of a proper 
appliance, and an otherwise safe job rendered dangerous by the circumstances in which the work is required 
to be done. Work which is dangerous for the untrained may be safe for those whose training and experience 
have made them adept in it." The third criterion mentioned in the text has already been discussed above. 
79. In determining whether an industry was of a nature to require special study, The Judge Advocate 
General of the United States Army rendered the following opinion in 1943: 
" ... If in particular industries the frequency of disabling injuries per million man-hours is: 
"a. Below 28.o-prisoner-of-war labor is generally available therein; 
"b. Between 28.0 and 35.o-the industry should be specifically studied, from the point of view of 
hazard, before assigning prisoner-of-war labor therein; 
"c. Over 35.o-prisoner-of-war labor is unavailable, except for the particular work therein which is 
not dangerous .... " 
80. Those interested in the history and background of this problem and the debate at the Diplomatic 
Conference are referred to the following sources: 1 ICRCReport 334; 3 Final Record 70-71; 2A ibid. 272-273, 
443-444, 345; 2B ibid. 290-295, 298-299; Pietet, Commentary 277-278. 
81. "This rule has the advantage of being clear and easy to apply. The reference is to objective rules 
enforced by that Power and not the personal feelings of any individual member of the armed forces. The 
essential thing is that the prisoner concerned may not be the laughing stock of the those around him." Pictet, 
Commentary 277. 
82. Although prohibitions against the use of prisoners of war on humiliating work were contained in 
Art. 25 of the Declaration of Brussels and Art. 71 of the Oxford Manual (note 4 above), there was no similar 
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provision in the 1929 Convention. Nevertheless, during World War II the United States recognized the 
prohibition against the employment of prisoners of war on degrading or menial work as a "well settled rule 
of the customary law of nations" (MacKnight, loc. cit. note 31 above, at 54), and even prohibited their 
employment as orderlies for other than their own officers (Le\vis, History 113). While this latter type of work 
is prohibited for personnel of the U. S. Army, it is believed that the prohibition is based upon policy rather 
than upon the "humiliating" nature of an orderly'S functions. Apparently this is settled policy for the United 
States, as the same rule is found in the draft of the new directive on the subject of prisoner-of-war labor which 
is being prepared by the U. S. Army. 
83. In addition, Art. 25 prescribes specific minimum ~tandards for accommodations; Art. 26 provides for 
such additional rations as may be necessary because of the nature of the labor on which the prisoners of war 
are employed; and Art. 27 provides that prisoners of war shall receive clothing appropriate to the work to 
which they are assigned. It has been asserted that not only must the living conditions of prisoner-of-war laborers 
not be inferior to those oflocal nationals, but also that this provision may not "prevent the application of the 
other provisions of the Convention if, for instance, the standard of living of citizens of the Detaining Power 
is lower than the minimum standard required for the maintenance of prisoners of war." Pictet, Commentary 
271. While the draftsmen did intend to establish two separate standards (2A Final Record 401), at least as to 
clothing, it is difficult to believe that any belligerent will provide prisoners of war \vith a higher standard of 
living than that to which its own civilian citizens have been reduced as a result of a rigid war economy. 
84. Ibid. 275. 
85. Pictet, Commentary 271-272. 
86. 2A Final Record 275. 
87. It could be argued that a proper grammatical construction of the provision of the Convention makes 
only the protective equipment and not the training subject to national standards. However, this is debatable, 
and, even if true, it would merely result in the application of an international standard in the very area where 
the national standard would probably be highest. 
88. The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (note 26 above, at 1002) 
mentioned "forced labor in tropical heat without protection from the sun" as one of the atrocities committed 
against prisoners of war by the Japanese. The motion picture, "The Bridge on the River Kwai," graphically 
portrayed the problem. 
89. Art. 27 of the 1949 Convention specifically mentions that, in issuing clothing to prisoners of war 
(without regard to the work at which they are employed), the Detaining Power "shall make allowance for 
the climate of the region where the prisoners are detained. " 
90. Art. 89 of the 1949 Convention contains an enumeration of the punishments which may be 
administered to a prisoner of war as a discip!inary measure for minor violations of applicable rules and 
regulations. 
91. At the Diplomatic Conference Mr. B.J. Wilhelm, the representative of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, stated that experience had indicated that the majority of all prisoners of war were maintained 
in labor detachments. 2A Final Record 276. This is confirmed by the series of articles which had appeared in 
the International Labour Review during the course of World War II. See 47 International Labour Review 
169, note 23 above, at 187 (general); 48 ibid. 316, note 24 above, at318 (Germany); Anon., "The Employment 
of Prisoners ofWarin Great Britain," 49 ibid. 191 (Feb., 1944); andMacKnight,loc. cit. note 31 above, at 49 
(United States). 
92. In addition to the requirements of Art. 56 for the observance of the present Convention in labor 
detachments, specific provisions as to these detachments are contained in Arts. 33 (medical services), 35 
(spiritual services), and 79 and 81 (prisoners' representatives), among others. 
93. For example, Art. 25 provides that the billets provided for prisoners of war must be adequately heated. 
The fact that the parent prisoner-of-war camp has central heating, while the billets occupied by the men of 
the labor detachment have separate, but adequate, heating facilities, does not constitute a violation of the 
Convention. 
94. This latter provision is included in order to enable them to register a complaint concerning their 
treatment, should they believe that it is below Convention standards. Of course, complaints may also be made 
to the representatives of the Protecting Power, who may visit these detachments whenever they so desire 
(Arts. 56 and 126), but these latter are not always immediately available, while the prisoners' representatives 
are. During World War II, both Great Britain and the United States provided for inspections by their own 
military authorities of the treatment of prisoners of war who were working for private employers. Anon., 
"The Employment of Prisoners of War in Great Britain," note 91 above, at 192; Mason, loc. cit. note 51 
above, at 212. 
95. Members of the U. S. Armed Forces may not accept parole, except for very limited purposes. Code 
of Conduct, Exec. Order No. 10631, Aug. 17, 1955,20 Fed. Reg. 6057; The Law of Land Warfare, FM 
86 Levie on the Law of War 
27-10, U. S. Army,July, 1956, sec. 187. The British rule is substantially similar. Manual of Military Law, Part 
III, The Law of War on Land, 1958, sec. 246, note 1. 
96. In Pictet, Commentary 296, the argument is made, and with considerable merit, that escape is an 
act of war and that only military personnel of the Detaining Power are authorized to respond to this act of 
war with another act of wa~the use of weapons against a prisoner of war. This theory finds support in the 
safeguards surrounding the use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially those involved in escapes, found 
in Art. 42 of the 1949 Convention. 
97. See, for example, the World War I agreements listed in note 19 above, and Lauterpacht, "The 
Problem of the Revision of the Laws of War," 29 Brit. Yr. Bk. ofInt. Law 360, 373 {1952}. 
98. By becoming parties to the Convention they have given up their sovereign right to enter into special 
agreements adversely affecting the rights guaranteed to prisoners of war by the Convention. 
99. Statement of Mr. R.J. Wilhelm, the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
2A Final Record 275. 
100. 2B ibid. 300. 
101. The Conference of Government Experts called by the ICRC in 1947 had originally considered 
setting maximum working hours, but finally decided against it as being "discrimination in favour ofPW, which 
would not be acceptable to the civilian population of the DP." Report on the Work of the Conference of 
Government Experts 176 (1947). As stated in Anon., "The Conditions of Employment of Prisoners of War," 
note 23 above, at 194: 
"The prisoner cannot expect better treatment than the civilian workers of the detaining Power •.•• His 
fate depends upon the extent to which the standards of the country where he is imprisoned have been lowered 
through the exigencies of the war." 
102. During World War II, many countries used the piece or task-work method of controlling 
prisoner-of-war labor. Pictet, Commentary 282; Anon., "The Employment of Prisoners of War in Canada," 
note 61 above, at 337. In the United States the piece-work system was used, but to control pay rather than 
work hours. Lewis, History 120-121. As long as the pay does not drop below the minimum prescribed by the 
Convention, there would appear to be no objection to this procedure. 
103. Nor was it subject to national standards in the 1929 Convention, but the Germans refused to accord 
prisoners of war a weekly day of rest on the ground that the civilian population did not receive it. Janner, 
op.cit. note 50 above. 
104. Pictet, Commentary 313; ICRC Report 286. 
105. Actually, Art. 62 refers to "working rate of pay" twice and to "working pay" four times, while Arts. 
54 and 64 refer only to "working pay." The term "indemnite de travail" is used in the French version of all 
of these articles and the difference in English appears to be an error in drafting. The report of the Financial 
Ello-perts at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference {2A Final Record 557} states: 
"It appeared that the expression 'wages' was inappropriate and might give the impression that prisoners 
of war while fed and housed at the cost of the Detaining Power were in addition being remunerated for their 
work at a rate corresponding to the remuneration of a civilian worker responsible for maintaining himself and 
his family out ofhis wages. For this reason, it was decided to substitute the terms 'working pay' wherever this 
was necessary." 
106. The inadequacy of the rninimum set by the Convention, which amounts to approximately six cents 
a day in money of the United States {approximately 5 d. in British money}, is illustrated by the fact that almost 
a century ago, in 1864, during the American Civil War, the Federal Governmentset the rate of prisoner-of-war 
pay at ten cents a day for the skilled and five cents a day for the unskilled! Lewis, History 39. During World 
War II the United States paid prisoners of war 80 cents a day. Ibid. at 77. Under the incentive of the piece-work 
system it was possible to increase this to $1.20 a day. Ibid. at 120. 
107. For some of these differences, see the quotation in note 105 above, and Mojonny, The Labor of 
Prisoners of War 24 {unpublished thesis, Indiana University, 1954}. For a contrary view, see Pictet, 
Commentary 115. 
108. During World War II the Germans habitually paid Soviet prisoners of war as little as one-half of the 
amount paid to prisoners of war of other nationalities. Dallin, note 25 above, at 425. Art. 16 of the 1949 
Convention specifically prohibits "adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political 
opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria." 
109. This was the policy followed by the United States during World War II. Prisoner of War Circular 
No.1, note 31 above, sec. 85. 
110. Flory, op. cit., note 29 above, at 79-80. The prisoner-of-war agreement concluded between France 
and Germany in 1915 had still a different approach: it provided that, upon repatriation, prisoners of war who 
had suffered industrial accidents would be treated as wounded combatants. Rosenberg, "International Law 
Concerning Accidents to War Prisoners Employed in Private Enterprises," 36 AJ.I.L. 294, 297 {1942}. 
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111. Lauterpacht, loc. cit. note 97 above. Lauterpacht labels the negotiations as "elaborate" and as 
"concerning the relatively trivial question of the interpretation of Article 27." 
112. Prisoner of War Circular No.1, note 31 above, sees. 91 and 92; MacKnight,loe. cit. note 31 above, 
at 63. 
113. Lauterpacht, loe. cit. 
114. E.g., Lewis, History 156. 
115. In the British Manual of Military Law, op. cit. note 95 above, sec. 185, note 1, the statement is made 
that during the World War II negotiations the United Kingdom "considered that its domestic workmen's 
compensation legislation was too complex and so bound up with the conditions of free civilian workmen as 
to make it impracticable to apply it to prisoners of war." That position has become no less valid with the 
passing of the years since the end of that war. 
116. Arts. 40 and 95 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (6 U. S. Treaties 3516; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287 (1:973); 50 AJ.I.L. Supp. 724 (1956» place 
upon the Detaining Power the additional burden of providing compensation for occupational accidents and 
diseases. The variation between the two conventions was noted by the Co-ordination Committee of the 
Diplomatic Conference (2B Final Record 149), but Committee II, to which had been assigned the 
responsibility for preparing the te,,:t of the prisoner-of-war convention, determined that such a provision was 
not necessary for prisoners of war (2A Final Record 402). 
117. The suggestion has been made that, "since under Article 51, paragraph 2, he [the prisoner of war] 
is covered by the national legislation [of the Detaining Power] concerning the protection oflabour," a prisoner 
of war disabled in an industrial accident or by an industrial disease would, while still a prisoner of war, be 
entitled to benefit from local workmen's compensation laws. Pictet, Commentary 286-287. It is believed that 
the application of this general provision of the Convention has been restricted in this area by the specific 
provision on this subject. 
118. Anon., "The Conditions of Employment of Prisoners of War," note 23 above, at 182; Pictet, loe. 
cit. 
119. The availability of the latter as a channel of complaint is not clearly defmed. Levie, "Prisoners of 
War and the Protecting Power," loe. cit. note 63 above, at 396. 
120. The activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross are likewise a major deterrent to the 
improper application of the Convention. 
121. Statement of German General Keitel, quoted in the "Opinion and Judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal," 41 AJ.I.L. 172,228-229 (1947). 
